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I.

Introduction

It is sometimes claimed that vertical mergers are inherently different from horizontal mergers
because there is no elimination of a competitor. 1 It similarly is said that there is no increase in
market concentration, unlike a horizontal merger. 2 In this article, we explain why both of these
claims are false. We show that there in an inherent loss of an indirect competitor that supported
the non-merging competitors in the pre-merger world, which leads to reduced competition when
there is an input foreclosure concern. We also show that it is possible to calculate an effective
increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measure of concentration for the downstream
market, when the competitive concern is input foreclosure. We refer to this “proxy” measure as
the “dHHI.” This increase in effective concentration is separate from any increase in postmerger concentration that might occur in the downstream market if there is foreclose that
actually reduces the market shares of foreclosed rivals and increases the market share of the
merged firm. The dHHI (and associated post-merger HHI) can be used as potentially probative
evidence in vertical merger matters.
The focus on indirect competition and the possible role for the dHHI proxy can be illustrated by
the litigation involving the proposed acquisition of Farelogix by Sabre. 3 Sabre is a Global
Distribution System (GDS) that provides a platform for travel agencies to search and book airline
flights. Farelogix provides a technology used by airlines to bypass a GDS and interact directly
with the travel agencies. As such, Sabre and the airlines are competing for the travel agencies’
booking business, and the acquisition of Farelogix by Sabre was formally a vertical merger.
* The authors are Vice President and Director of Economic Modeling at Charles River Associates
(Moresi); Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and Senior Consultant at
Charles River Associates (Salop). The analysis and opinions expressed here are our own and do not
necessarily represent the views of our colleagues or consulting clients. We would like to thank Herb
Hovenkamp for helpful comments.
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See, e.g., D. Bruce Hoffman, Acting Director, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Vertical
Merger Enforcement at the FTC 3 (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1304213/hoffman_vertical_merger_speec
h_final.pdf.
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United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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United States v. Sabre Corp., No. 19-1548-LPS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64637 (D. Del. Apr. 7, 2020).
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However, the Department of Justice (DOJ) characterized the acquisition as a horizontal merger.
In doing so, it emphasized statements by Sabre that it competes with Farelogix for providing
airlines with access to travel agencies. While accepting this competition, the court rejected the
DOJ’s complaint because it concluded that Sabre competes on both sides of a two-sided market
(i.e., airlines and travel agencies), whereas Farelogix competes only on one side (i.e., airlines).
Armed with our analysis, the DOJ alternatively could have framed the proposed acquisition as a
vertical merger, but explained to the court that the merger had indirect horizontal effects because
Farelogix supported competition between Sabre and the airlines in the market for booking
services to travel agencies. The DOJ might have gone further and illustrated the magnitude of
the effective reduction in horizontal competition by calculating dHHIs based on Farelogix
current sales and also on estimates of its future sales to airlines absent the merger.
The dHHI proxy also might be useful in the formation of safe harbors or anticompetitive
presumptions for vertical mergers that raise input foreclosure or downstream output reduction
concerns, perhaps in conjunction with other evidence. The Vertical Merger Guidelines do not
suggest any safe harbor or anticompetitive presumption based on either shares or concentration. 4
We previously showed that the first-round incentives to engage in input foreclosure after a
vertical merger by raising input prices–which we denote as the upward pricing pressure (UPP)–
can be related to the analogous UPP resulting from a horizontal merger. In this article, we show
how the increase in the effective horizontal concentration (dHHI) from a vertical merger also can
be related to these UPP measures. 5 We specifically derive the dHHI measure by comparing the
pricing incentives and associated UPPs involved in two alternative types of acquisitions: (i)
vertical mergers that raise unilateral input foreclosure or output reduction concerns (and the
associated vertical gross upward pricing pressure index (vertical GUPPI or vGUPPI) measures),
and (ii) horizontal acquisitions of partial ownership interests among competitors that raise
unilateral effects concerns (and the associated modified GUPPI and modified HHI measures). 6
4

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, (June 30, 2020)
[hereinafter “VMGs”], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-federaltrade-commission-vertical-merger-guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf. The draft VMGs
released for public comment on January 10, 2020 suggested a safe harbor based on a 20% market share
threshold, under which vertical mergers would have been considered unlikely to be anticompetitive. The
agencies received more than 70 comments on the January draft, and the final version included significant
improvements, including the elimination of the 20% market share “safe harbor.”
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Serge Moresi & Steven. C. Salop, vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers,
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 185 (2013).
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U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 33 (2010)
[hereinafter “HMGs”], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/mergerreview/100819hmg.pdf; Daniel P. O’Brien & Steve C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership:
Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559 (2000); Andrea Asoni & Yianis
Sarafidis, Economic Tools for Gauging the Competitive Effects of Partial Acquisitions in the Energy
Sector, TRANSP., ENERGY & ANTITRUST, COMM. NEWSLETTER 3 (Summer 2017),
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This connection between the vGUPPIs for vertical mergers and the modified HHIs (mHHIs) for
horizontal partial ownership transactions demonstrates the horizontal nature of the concern raised
by potential input foreclosure in vertical mergers and how this horizontal concern is connected to
the unilateral effects concern from horizontal mergers or horizontal partial ownership
transactions. The connection demonstrates that there is not an “inherent” difference in the
competitive concerns, as is sometimes claimed. The impact on pricing incentives and effective
concentration from input foreclosure concerns is the same as the impact of an identifiable
hypothetical horizontal consolidation involving partial ownership interests between the
downstream merging firm and its potentially foreclosed rivals.
The dHHI is based on the way in which the pricing incentives that arise in vertical mergers
involving unilateral input foreclosure or output reduction concerns are similar to the pricing
incentives arising from partial ownership interests among competing firms. It is derived
analytically from consideration of two UPP measures—the vGUPPIs used to gauge unilateral
input foreclosure effects and the modified GUPPIs (“mGUPPIs”) that are used to gauge
unilateral price effects from partial ownership interests among horizontal competitors—and the
associated mHHI concentration measure. The dHHI analysis also has some intuitive properties
that can make it a useful addition to the antitrust toolkit.
We frame our formal analysis of input foreclosure and downstream output reduction incentives
in the context of a standard vertical industry model in which the upstream firms are Bertrand
competitors selling differentiated inputs to downstream firms, and the downstream firms are
Bertrand competitors selling differentiated substitute products to consumers. 7 The vertically
merged firm may have the incentive to engage in an input foreclosure strategy by raising the
price of the input charged to one or several targeted downstream rivals. In extreme cases, the
merged firm may have the incentive to raise the input price to a prohibitively high level that
totally forecloses the (targeted) downstream rivals from access to its input. Such partial or total
input foreclosure can be profitable to the merged firm because it can raise the costs faced by the
http://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/Economic-Tools-for-Gauging-the-CompetitiveEffects-of-Partial-Acquisitions-in-the-energy-sector.pdf.
7

The model assumes for simplicity that there initially are no vertically integrated firms. Each
downstream firm sets the price of its product unilaterally, in the sense that it takes the prices charged by
all the other firms as given. Similarly, each upstream firm sets the prices of its input to the downstream
firms unilaterally (i.e., it takes the prices charged by the other upstream firms as given) but takes into
account that raising the price of its input to a given downstream firm will induce that downstream firm to
increase its downstream price in response. See Roman Inderst & Tommaso Valletti, Incentives for Input
Foreclosure, 55 EUR. ECON. REV. 820 (2011); Moresi & Salop, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined.. Other models assume that each upstream firm negotiates bilaterally with each downstream firm
over the price of the input. See, e.g., Patrick Rey & Thibaud Vergé, Secret Contracting in Multilateral
Relations (Nov. 26, 2019, https://www.tse-fr.eu/publications/secret-contracting-multilateral-relations;
Serge Moresi, Vertical Mergers and Bargaining Models: Simultaneous versus Sequential Pricing (Feb.
19, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3541099.
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downstream rivals, and hence can lead to diversion of sales from the downstream rivals to the
downstream merging firm. It simultaneously can lead the downstream rivals to raise prices to
consumers, which then can allow the downstream merging firm to increase its price, its market
share or some combination of the two. 8
At the outset, we want to emphasize several features of the dHHI and vGUPPI measures as well
as some associated caveats and limitations.
First, it is important to recognize that the dHHI measures only the increase in effective
concentration in the downstream market. We do not derive a measure of the increase in effective
concentration in the upstream market.
Second, our formal model focuses on the effects of a vertical merger on unilateral incentives to
raise downstream prices and engage in input foreclosure. It also examines only “first-round”
effects. Output reduction and input foreclosure conduct by the merged firm likely also would
lead to pricing effects by rival firms at either level of the vertical supply chain. Total foreclosure
or price increases by the upstream merging firm may lead its competitors to respond with
accommodating input price increases of their own. These price increases might be unilateral (or
more strictly, multilateral) or they may be coordinated. 9 At the downstream level, price
increases by the merged firm likely would induce other downstream firms to raise their own
prices unilaterally even in the absence of input foreclosure. In addition, input foreclosure may
raise the costs of a maverick competitor, which could facilitate downstream coordination. 10

8

The input foreclosure also could lead to accommodating responses either by the upstream rivals of the
merged firm (they also would increase their input prices to the targeted downstream rivals) or by the nontargeted downstream rivals (they also would increase their output prices to consumers). These
accommodating responses would exacerbate the anticompetitive effects of input foreclosure. Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power
over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner & Steven C. Salop, Equilibrium
Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990).
9

We assume unilateral conduct pre-merger. Intuitively, if pre-merger the upstream merging firm were to
raise its input prices to downstream firms, the other upstream firms would not match the price increase
because they would anticipate that the upstream merging firm likely would then “cheat” and reduce price.
So, upstream coordination does not occur pre-merger. Post-merger, however, upstream coordination
targeted at the rivals of the downstream merging firm is more likely to occur than pre-merger. The reason
is that the upstream merging firm would have a weaker incentive to “cheat” since reducing its input prices
to downstream rivals would reduce the downstream profit earned by the downstream merging firm. See
also Hans-Theo Normann, Vertical Integration, Raising Rivals' Costs and Upstream Collusion, 53
EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 461 (2009); Volker Nocke & Lucy White, Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate
Upstream Collusion?, 97 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 1321 (2007).
10

Downstream coordination increases the profit of the downstream merging firm, but reduces the profit
that the upstream merging firm earns from sales to downstream rivals. It is possible that the overall effect
of downstream coordination would be to increase the total profits of the merged firm. See also Pedro
Mendi, Backward Integration and Collusion in a Duopoly Model with Asymmetric Costs, 96 J. ECON. 95
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While coordination can play a role in input foreclosure, we are not explicitly taking account of
coordinated effects theories of harm in the formal model. The dHHI (like the vGUPPIs) does not
take any of these possibilities into account. However, we will discuss the role of coordinated
conduct outside the formal model.
Third, we are focusing on input foreclosure, not customer foreclosure. While the analysis of
customer foreclosure is analogous, it also differs in some ways. It typically involves reducing
rivals’ revenues instead or in addition to increasing rivals’ costs. The dHHI (like the vGUPPIs)
is not derived here with an eye towards customer foreclosure. 11
Fourth, because we are focusing on concentration (and its possible use as a safe harbor screen or
anticompetitive presumption), the dHHI does not take into account any merger-specific
elimination of double marginalization (“EDM”) or other cognizable efficiencies. This is the
same approach taken for horizontal mergers, where the delta HHI is based on pre-merger market
shares and only captures the change in post-merger incentives in a very limited and imperfect
way.12 Of course, any cognizable EDM or other efficiencies would be analyzed if the merger is
investigated further.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we show how the vertically
merging firms are “indirect competitors” in the pre-merger world and how the merger is a like a
horizontal consolidation that eliminates this indirect competition. The indirect competition that
we study is not the possibility that an input producer might enter the downstream market in
competition with its future downstream merger partner absent the merger. Instead, we mean the
input producer supports the downstream competitors of the future downstream merger partner by
selling inputs to them. In Section III, we derive the dHHI to proxy for the increase in effective
concentration in the downstream market and explain how it can be measured in practice. The
dHHI is based on vGUPPIs, the relationship between vertical and horizontal GUPPIs, and the

(2009); Sara Biancini & David Ettinger, Vertical Integration and Downstream Collusion, 53 INT. J. IND.
ORGAN. 99 (2017).
11

It is the case that customer foreclosure can lead to input foreclosure. For example, suppose customer
foreclosure leads a targeted upstream rival or rivals to lose substantial sales and this raises their marginal
costs or leads to exit. As a result, the upstream merging firm (and its remaining competitors) may gain
the power to raise input prices to the rivals of the downstream firm, either unilaterally or through
coordinated action. This input foreclosure then could raise the costs of the downstream rivals and harm
consumers. However, our analysis and the dHHI are not directly geared towards this possibility either.
12

For a summary and citations to the original articles, see Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in 40 Years, 77 ANTITRUST L. J. 701, 751 (2010). The delta HHI
often is considered a screen for the increase in coordination concerns, based on work by Stigler. Willig
showed that the delta HHI also is related to the GUPPI under the assumption that diversion ratios are
proportional to market shares and market demand is perfectly inelastic. The delta HHI also is related to
the increase in the average price-cost margin in the Cournot model, though the use of pre-merger market
shares implies that it overstates the increase (since absent efficiencies the market shares of the merging
firms will be smaller post-merger than pre-merger).
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mHHI for horizontal acquisitions of partial ownership interests. In Section IV, we discuss how
the dHHI can be used in practice to form a general indicator (like the delta HHI in horizontal
mergers), a safe harbor, or an anticompetitive presumption. In Section V, we briefly explain that
the vGUPPIs themselves could be used instead of the dHHI, address some criticisms that have
been made of the vGUPPI methodology in two recent papers, and derive simultaneous vGUPPIs
in response. Section VI concludes.
II.

The Potential Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers Are Not Inherently Different
from Horizontal Mergers

While there is no increase in the nominal level of concentration in the downstream market from a
vertical merger, our analysis shows that there is a loss of an indirect competitor and therefore an
increase in effective concentration in the downstream market. We also show how to derive a
proxy dHHI measure for the increase in effective concentration. These two ideas of indirect
competition and effective concentration flow from the same economic analysis.
We derive the dHHI measure by comparing the vGUPPIs for vertical mergers (that raise
unilateral input foreclosure or downstream output reduction concerns) and the mGUPPIs for
horizontal acquisitions of partial ownership interests among competitors (that raise unilateral
effects concerns). Specifically, we show that the effects on pricing incentives from a vertical
merger are identical to the effects on pricing incentives from a particular hypothetical transaction
involving partial ownership interests among the downstream firms (in the sense that the
mGUPPIs would be equal to the vGUPPIs). We then define the dHHI as equal to the increase in
the mHHI from the equivalent hypothetical horizontal transactions.
These connections between the vGUPPIs and the mHHIs for partial ownership transactions
demonstrate the horizontal nature of the concern raised by input foreclosure in vertical mergers
and how this horizontal concern can be related to the unilateral effects concern from horizontal
mergers or horizontal partial ownership transactions. The connections also demonstrate that the
underlying economic analysis does not involve an “inherent” difference in competitive concerns.
This latter property is derived in the formal model to follow.
To understand at an intuitive level the relationship between the competitive concerns of the two
types of mergers, a useful starting point is the claim that a vertical merger does not inherently
eliminate a competitor or competition, unlike a horizontal merger. While this observation might
appear to apply in a superficial sense, economic analysis of input foreclosure shows why it is not
economically correct. The error is that the claim ignores the fact that in the pre-merger market,
the (future) upstream merging firm is an “indirect competitor” of the (future) downstream
merging firm. This is because the upstream firm sells inputs to the competitors of the (future)
downstream merger partner, and therefore has a role in “supporting” competition in the
downstream market by rivals of its (future) downstream merger partner. In this sense, the
(future) upstream merging firm has some “indirect control” over the ability of the downstream
rivals to compete with the (future) downstream merging firm. By providing inputs to these rivals
6

(in competition with other upstream firms), the upstream firm facilitates and increases
competition in the downstream market.
However, the vertical merger changes these incentives. After the merger, the upstream merging
firm has a unilateral incentive to reduce its support of the downstream competitors and
competition. That is because the merger leads the upstream merging firm to take account of the
fact that raising input prices to the rivals of the downstream merging firm leads to diversion of
downstream sales from the rivals to the downstream merging firm. For this reason, there is an
inherent horizontal element to a vertical merger that might lead to anticompetitive effects of
input foreclosure.
To illustrate, Example 2 in the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines supposes that upstream orange
groves supply oranges as inputs in the pre-merger market to juice makers, and it considers a
merger between one of the orange groves and one of the juice makers. 13 Suppose that both the
oranges and the juices are differentiated products. Assume further that some juice maker
competitors of the downstream merging firm are unable to engage in any substitution by
purchasing oranges from other upstream firms, perhaps because only those oranges fit into their
juicing machines.14 By raising its orange prices to these downstream competitors, the merging
orange grove raises the costs of these rivals, which allows it in effect to have some indirect
control over the production and pricing incentives of these downstream rivals. 15 Thus, the
vertical merger would allow the merged firm to raise rivals’ orange costs in the juice market,
thereby possibly creating incentives for each of these targeted rivals to raise their own
downstream juice prices.
This raises the question of whether the merged firm would have the incentive to do so. In the
pre-merger market equilibrium, the upstream merging firm has no incentive to raise its input
orange prices to rivals of the downstream merging juice maker, because the upstream merging
firm in the pre-merger world ignores the benefits accruing to the downstream merging firm if its
rivals raise their prices. After the merger, however, the merged firm will not ignore and instead
will fully internalize the benefits obtained by its downstream division when the targeted rivals
raise their juice prices or reduce their juice output (following a targeted input price increase by
the upstream firm). It is in this sense that the vertical merger creates a type of indirect horizontal
consolidation between the downstream merging juice firm and the foreclosed rival juice firms.
13

VMGs, supra note 4 at 6.

14

Even here, the incentives to raise input prices to these downstream firms would be limited by a number
of factors, including (i) the pass-through of the input price increases into the output prices of these
downstream firms, (ii) downstream competition from firms that do not purchase inputs from the upstream
merging firm, and (iii) the elasticity of demand in the downstream market.
15

The upstream merging firm does not exert direct control over the production and pricing decisions of
the firms that it supplies (as it would if it owned those firms) but instead it controls them indirectly
through changes in the input prices that it charges to them.
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The merged firm also will have an incentive to reduce output and increase prices to consumers
because it will take account of the fact that an increase in the prices charged to consumers by its
downstream division would cause diversion of sales to downstream rivals, who then would
purchase more inputs from the upstream merging firm. 16 This incentive is another inherent
horizontal effect, which we refer to as the “Chen effect.” 17 Intuitively, from the perspective of
the downstream merging firm, the upstream merging firm has a “financial interest” in each
downstream rival to which it sells inputs; when the rival sells an additional unit to consumers,
the upstream merging firm obtains a “dividend” equal to the upstream merging firm’s margin on
input sales to that rival. Through the vertical merger, therefore, the downstream merging firm
acquires a “financial interest” in each rival supplied by the upstream merging firm. To illustrate,
suppose that a rival of the downstream merging firm purchases one unit of input from the
upstream merging firm for each unit of output that it produces. Suppose further that the dollar
margins of the rival and the upstream merging firm are equal. Then, the vertical merger would
have the same effect on the pricing incentives of the downstream merging firm as a hypothetical
horizontal merger between the downstream merging firm and the rival. If the dollar margin of
the upstream merging firm is smaller than the dollar margin of the downstream rival, the
equivalent hypothetical horizontal transaction would be the acquisition of a partial ownership
interest in the rival, and not a full merger. This inherent horizontal effect (from the upstream
merging firm having a “financial interest” in downstream rivals) is distinct from and in addition
to the inherent horizontal effect (from the upstream merging firm having “indirect control” over
downstream rivals) discussed in the previous paragraphs.
While the vertical merger has these two inherent horizontal effects, these effects are not
equivalent to a horizontal merger. Instead, as we show in our model, they are more closely
related to partial ownership transactions among the downstream competitors. It is for this reason
that the dHHI proxy measure for vertical mergers is based on the mHHI measure used for
horizontal partial ownership transactions.
III.

The dHHI is a Proxy for the Increase in Effective Concentration in the Downstream
Market

The dHHI measure is based on two simultaneous, hypothetical partial ownership transactions
that would create the same effects on pricing incentives as the vertical merger. In one
hypothetical transaction, each of the rivals that would be targeted for input foreclosure obtains a
silent (that is, passive, non-voting) partial financial interest in the downstream merging firm. In
16

As indicated previously, we do not take into account any merger-specific EDM or other cognizable
efficiencies at this stage of the analysis. As with horizontal mergers, any cognizable efficiencies would
be analyzed if the merger is investigated further.
17

See Yongmin Chen, On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects, 32 RAND J. ECON. 667, 668
(2001).
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the other hypothetical transaction, the downstream merging firm acquires a silent partial
financial interest in each of its rivals that purchase the input of the upstream merging firm. The
dHHI is equal to the increase in the mHHI from both of these hypothetical horizontal
transactions taken together.18
A.

The Hypothetical Horizontal Transaction to Capture the UPP of the
Targeted Downstream Rivals

The driving force of our analysis is that the merging firms may be indirect competitors in the
pre-merger market. If an upstream firm is supplying inputs to the rivals of a downstream firm,
that upstream firm is in effect supporting competition in the downstream market by the rivals of
that downstream firm. It is in this sense that the upstream merging firm is an indirect competitor
of the downstream merging firm in the pre-merger market.
The vertical merger specifically may reduce or eliminate the incentives of the upstream merging
firm to support the competition from the rivals of the downstream merging firm. The vertical
merger thus creates a type of indirect horizontal consolidation between the downstream merging
firm and each foreclosed rival firm. The dHHI concept is a way to capture this consolidation
with a concentration measure based on the analysis of the incentive effects of partial ownership
interests among competitors. More precisely, instead of thinking about a targeted downstream
rival as having an incentive to raise its price because the upstream merging firm raised the input
price to that rival, we proxy for this effect by determining that rival’s identical incentive to raise
price “as if” it had acquired a silent partial financial interest in the downstream merging firm.
This equivalent hypothetical horizontal partial ownership transaction is a useful way to look at
the potential effect of the vertical merger on the targeted downstream rival. If there are multiple
downstream firms targeted for input foreclosure, then there will be additional such hypothetical
horizontal transactions. The incentive effect of these hypothetical horizontal transactions can be
gauged as an increase in the mHHI of the downstream market.19 The dHHI measure then is
defined as the increase in the mHHI resulting from these equivalent hypothetical horizontal
transactions (and from the other transactions discussed in Section III.B below).
In our vGUPPI article,20 we gauge the resulting effect on the pricing incentives of the foreclosed
rival(s) with the vGUPPIr measure.21 We next briefly review this measure and then explain how

18

For input foreclosure, the VMGs formally define only a downstream market, using the same market
definition methodology as in the HMGs. See VMGs, supra note 4 at §3. In addition, the VMGs define
an upstream “related product.” Id.
19

O’Brien & Salop, supra note 6.

20

Moresi & Salop, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..

21

The vGUPPIu is related to the vGUPPIr but is not our focus for the derivation of the proxy dHHI of the
downstream market.

9

we derive the hypothetical, equivalent horizontal transaction and the corresponding increase in
the mHHI.
1.

vGUPPIr

An increase in the input price that the upstream merging firm charges to a downstream rival
targeted for input foreclosure would raise the marginal cost of production of the rival, which
would give the rival an incentive to raise its own price. This mechanism suggests the relevance
of the upward pricing incentives of the downstream rival whose costs would be raised postmerger. The vGUPPIr translates the merged firm’s incentive to raise the input price it charges to
a foreclosed downstream rival into the resulting impact on the incentive of the foreclosed rival to
raise its output price. Formally, 22

𝑣𝐺𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑟 = 𝑃𝑇𝑅

× 𝐷𝑅

× 𝑀 ×

𝑃
𝑃

(1)

where PTRU denotes the cost pass-through rate of the upstream merging firm, DRRD denotes the
diversion ratio from the foreclosed rival to the downstream merging firm, MD denotes the
percentage margin earned by the downstream merging firm, and PD / PR denotes the ratio of the
prices charged to consumers by the downstream merging firm and the foreclosed rival.
2.

The Equivalent Hypothetical Horizontal Transaction

As explained above, a key point of our approach is that input foreclosure reduces the intensity of
competition that the downstream merging firm faces from the foreclosed rivals. This creates a
horizontal effect that is analogous to the reduction in the intensity of competition that would
occur if instead of a vertical merger, each targeted rival were to behave “as if” it had acquired a
silent partial ownership interest (BRD) in the downstream merging firm. The effect of such
hypothetical, horizontal partial acquisition on a rival’s pricing incentives is gauged by the
horizontal mGUPPIr. Formally,23

𝑚𝐺𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑟 = 𝐵

× 𝐷𝑅

22

× 𝑀 ×

𝑃
𝑃

(2)

As discussed above, we assume no input substitution. If input substitution is possible, the vGUPPIr is
smaller and requires additional information. The assumption of no input substitution is appropriate for
our purpose of measuring a potential increase in effective concentration in the downstream market. We
discuss this issue in more detail in Section IV.B.
23

Asoni & Sarafidis, supra note 6.
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where BRD denotes the hypothetical, silent ownership share obtained by the (foreclosed) rival in
the downstream merging firm. Note that the factor DRRD × MD × PD / PR in equation (2) is the
standard horizontal GUPPI of the rival for a hypothetical merger with the downstream merging
firm.
Comparing equations (1) and (2), the vertical merger creates UPP on a foreclosed rival that is
identical to the UPP that would be created if the rival were to acquire a silent ownership share
equal to the cost pass-through rate of the upstream merging firm (i.e., BRD = PTRU).24 Thus, this
is the equivalent hypothetical partial ownership transaction.
For example, suppose that the cost pass-through rate is equal to 50%. 25 Then, for each
foreclosed rival, the UPP is identical to that from a hypothetical acquisition by the rival of a 50%
silent ownership share in the downstream merging firm. If there are multiple rivals that would
be foreclosed with input price increases, then each of them would behave “as if” it had obtained
a 50% silent ownership share in the downstream merging firm. 26 The effects of each of these
hypothetical transactions involving the targeted downstream rivals would need to be summed up
to evaluate the total competitive effect.27
3.

Contribution to the dHHI in the Downstream Market

This UPP analysis thus shows how the impact of potential input foreclosure on the pricing
incentives of targeted downstream rivals can be reckoned into a dHHI calculation. The
contribution of the vGUPPIr to the dHHI can be measured with the increase in the mHHI from
the equivalent hypothetical partial ownership transactions. The mHHI formulation is the
following: if Firm-A acquires a silent partial ownership share β in Firm-B, the mHHI rises by the
magnitude β x SA x SB, where SA and SB are the market shares of the two firms.28 The following
examples show how this can be applied to input foreclosure.
Example: Consider a downstream market with five firms and assume that
each has a 20% market share. Suppose that the merged firm would be able
to target for input foreclosure only one of the four downstream rivals. The
24

BRD = PTRU is obtained by setting (1) equal to (2) and solving for BRD.

25

A cost pass-through rate of 50% is consistent with linear demand. Carl Shapiro suggested the use of a
50% pass-through rate as the default rate for horizontal GUPPIs. Shapiro, supra note 12, at 750.
26

Each foreclosed rival would have a vGUPPIr. See Moresi & Salop, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 200.
27

Our analysis uses hypothetical horizontal transactions, not actual horizontal transactions, to proxy for
the pricing incentive effects of a vertical merger. For example, the fact that (say) three targeted rivals
might behave “as if” each had a 50% ownership share in the downstream merging firm does not mean that
real world ownership shares add up to 150%. Therefore, it does not imply that the increase in effective
concentration is overstated.
28

See O’Brien & Salop, supra note 6.
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contribution to the dHHI in the downstream market can be calculated from
the increase in the mHHI from a 50% silent financial interest transaction.
Applying the mHHI formula, the increase in effective concentration in the
downstream market, as measured by the mHHI, is equal to 200 (i.e., 0.5 x 20
x 20).
Example: Suppose instead that the upstream merging firm has two
downstream customers that it fully supplies and targets both of them for input
foreclosure. In this case, the increase in effective concentration is equal to
400 (i.e., 2 x 0.5 x 20 x 20).
This contribution to the dHHI arises from the impact of input foreclosure on the incentives of the
foreclosed downstream rivals. We turn next to the analysis of the impact of the vertical merger
on the incentives of the downstream merging firm.
B.

The Hypothetical Horizontal Transaction to Capture the UPP of the
Downstream Merging Firm

A vertical merger also changes the incentives of the downstream merging firm, whether or not
there are input foreclosure concerns. That is the Chen effect we discussed earlier: the vertical
merger reduces the incentive of the downstream merging firm to compete against rivals that are
customers of the upstream merging firm. 29 This is another way in which merging firms may be
seen as indirect competitors in the pre-merger market. Suppose that the upstream merging firm
is supplying inputs in the pre-merger market to some rivals of the downstream merging firm.
For simplicity, assume further that the downstream merging firm is not a customer of the
upstream merging firm.30 By unilaterally raising its output price, the downstream merging firm
will lose some sales, and a fraction of the lost sales will be captured by (i.e., diverted to) rival
downstream firms, including those rivals that are customers of the upstream merging firm. It
follows that the vertical merger would incentivize the downstream merging firm to raise its
output price because doing so would increase the input sales made by the upstream merging firm
to the downstream rivals. In the pre-merger market equilibrium, the downstream merging firm
has no incentive to raise its output price to gain this effect. This is because the pre-merger
downstream merging firm would have no reason to take into account any benefit received by the
future upstream merger partner. Post-merger, however, the merged firm will have the incentive
to internalize the benefit obtained by its upstream division when the downstream division raises
its output price.

29

Chen, supra note 17.

30

In this simple example, there cannot be any EDM since the downstream merging firm is not a customer
of the upstream merging firm. Because we are focusing solely on a measure of effective concentration,
we do not take into account any merger-specific EDM or other efficiencies at this stage of the analysis.
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The vertical merger creates a type of indirect horizontal consolidation between the downstream
merging firm and the rival firms that are customers of the upstream merging firm. As we
discussed above, we proxy for this vertical merger effect by considering that the downstream
merging firm has an identical incentive to raise price “as if” it had acquired a silent partial
financial interest in each of its rivals that are customers of the upstream merging firm. This
equivalent hypothetical horizontal transaction is a useful way to gauge the effect of vertical
merger on the pricing incentives of the downstream merging firm because it corresponds to an
increase in the mHHI of the downstream market.
The driving force of the partial ownership analogy here is that an increase in the price of the
downstream merging firm resulting from the vertical merger will cause diversion to other
downstream competitors, just as diversion would occur if the downstream merging firm raised its
price after acquiring a partial ownership interest in one or more of its competitors.
In our vGUPPI article, we gauged this Chen effect on the pricing incentives of the downstream
merging firm with the vGUPPId measure. We next briefly review this measure and then explain
how we derive the hypothetical, equivalent horizontal transaction and the corresponding increase
in the mHHI.
Before doing so, however, we want to point out that the Chen effect on the downstream merging
firm occurs whether or not downstream rivals are foreclosed by the upstream merging firm. 31 It
is a general effect of vertical mergers when rivals of the downstream merging firm are customers
of the upstream merging firm. In a full competitive effects analysis, it would mitigate or even
reverse the downward pricing pressure (“DPP”) from merger-specific EDM.
1.

vGUPPId

The vGUPPId gauges the post-merger UPP on the output price of the downstream merging firm.
It specifically gauges the UPP resulting from the Chen effect—that is, the fact that the merger
leads the downstream merging firm to reckon into its incentives the impact of its potential price
increase on the profits that the upstream merging firm earns from sales to downstream rivals.
Because we are focusing on a dHHI concept corresponding to the approach of the HMGs, the
appropriate vGUPPId measure does not include any potential impact on pricing incentives of
merger-specific EDM or other efficiencies. 32 Note also that this vGUPPId measure of the
31

Furthermore, this UPP effect—that the downstream division of the merged firm will have an incentive
to compete less aggressively in the downstream market if a rival is also a customer of the upstream
division—may induce the rival to continue to purchase the input from the upstream division, even if it
could obtain the input at a lower price from a different supplier. This is because switching to a different
supplier would intensify competition from the merged firm. Chen, supra note 17.
32

The Chen effect corresponds to the vGUPPId1 measure in our vGUPPI article. The article discusses
two other vGUPPId measures that do take account of any merger-specific EDM. Moresi & Salop, supra
note Error! Bookmark not defined.. These would be incorporated into a full competitive effects
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merger impact on the incentives of the downstream merging firm is independent of input
foreclosure.
The basic equation for the vGUPPId is written as follows:33

𝑣𝐺𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑑 = 𝐷𝑅

× 𝑆

× 𝑀

×

𝑊
𝑃

(3)

where DRDR denotes the diversion ratio from the downstream merging firm to a given rival, SUR
denotes the upstream merging firm’s share of that rival’s input purchases, WUR and MUR denote
the upstream merging firm’s price and percentage margin for input sales to that rival, and PD
denotes the downstream merger partner’s output price. 34 We consider the diversion to each rival
separately and, therefore, the total effect is found by aggregating across all rivals.
As explained above, it is important to recognize that vGUPPId measures only a first-round effect
and fails to take account of a number of important feedback effects. The vGUPPId specifically
holds constant the input prices of the upstream merging firm at the pre-merger level, and thus
holds constant both the upstream merging firm’s dollar margin (i.e., MUR × WUR in equation (3))
and the upstream merging firm’s share of the rival’s input purchases (i.e., SUR in equation (3)).
Thus, vGUPPId scores only the first-round incentive to raise the output price of the downstream
merging firm before there are any increases in the input price charged to any foreclosed
downstream rivals. Specifically, it does not take account of the impact of raising rivals’ costs on
the pricing incentives of the downstream merging firm.35 Nor does it take account of the impact
of raising rivals’ costs on the pricing incentives of the competing upstream firms and of the
competing downstream firms that are not foreclosed. Nor does it take into account any
cognizable EDM. In a full merger analysis, all those effects would be taken into account.

analysis, albeit not a safe harbor analysis before it is known whether the EDM is likely to occur or is
merger-specific. See VMGs, supra note 4, §6.
33

We are using equation (A14) of the technical appendix of our vGUPPI article, with the convention that
one unit of output requires one unit of the input under consideration (i.e., Ak =1). That is different from
the convention used in equation (3) of our vGUPPI article, where the input share SUR does not appear
explicitly in the formula (as it is accounted for in the calculation of the input “price” or input cost per unit
of output).
34

This incentive to raise the price of the downstream merging firm can be explained as follows. If the
downstream merging firm raises its price, a fraction of its lost sales (DRDR) will be diverted to the
downstream rival under consideration. However, that rival may use the upstream merging firm for a
share (SUR) of its input purchases, in which case the upstream merging firm gains incremental sales (DRDR
× SUR) and earns a dollar margin (MUR × WUR) on each incremental sale. Normalizing this effect as a
percentage of the output price of the downstream merging firm (PD) yields equation (3).
35

Similarly, the previous analysis of the pricing incentives of the upstream merging firm did not take
account of the impact of raising the output price of the downstream merging firm.
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2.

The Equivalent Hypothetical Horizontal Transaction

The vertical merger creates UPP on the output price of the downstream merging firm. This
creates a horizontal effect that is analogous to the effect that would occur if there were no
vertical merger but the downstream merging firm instead were to behave “as if” it had acquired a
silent partial ownership interest in each downstream rival that purchases inputs from the
upstream merging firm. The effect of such hypothetical, horizontal partial acquisition on the
downstream merging firm’s pricing incentives is gauged by the horizontal mGUPPId. Formally,

𝑚𝐺𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑑 = 𝐵

× 𝐷𝑅

× 𝑀 ×

𝑃
𝑃

(4)

where BDR denotes the hypothetical, silent ownership share obtained by the downstream merging
firm in the rival under consideration, and MR denotes that rival’s percentage margin. Note that
the factor DRDR × MR × PR / PD in equation (4) is the standard horizontal GUPPI of the
downstream merging firm for a hypothetical merger with that rival.
Comparing equations (3) and (4), it follows that the vertical merger creates UPP on the
downstream merging firm that is identical to the UPP that would be created if the downstream
merging firm instead were to acquire a silent ownership share in that rival equal to: 36

𝐵

=

𝑆

× 𝑀 × 𝑊
𝑀 × 𝑃

(5)

In words, this equivalent ownership share is equal to the upstream merging firm’s share of the
downstream rival’s input purchases (SUR ) multiplied by the upstream merging firm’s dollar
margin on input sales made to that rival (MUR × WUR) and divided by the rival’s dollar margin
(MR × PR).
For example, suppose that the ratio of the upstream to downstream dollar margins is 0.3, and
consider a downstream rival that purchases exclusively from the upstream merging firm, that is,
SUR = 100%. Then, diversion to that rival creates UPP on the downstream merging firm that is
identical to that from a hypothetical acquisition by the downstream merging firm of a 30% (i.e.,
100% x 0.30) silent financial ownership share in that rival. If there are multiple rivals that are
customers of the upstream merging firm, then there are additional effects that must similarly be
taken into account and added together to obtain the total effect on the mHHI.
The effect of the vertical merger on the downstream merging firm’s pricing incentives (ignoring
EDM) thus is the same as the effect on incentives from a horizontal partial ownership acquisition
36

Equation (5) is obtained by setting (3) equal to (4) and solving for BDR.
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by the downstream merging firm of each foreclosed downstream rival, where the partial interest
is a share BDR that account for the upstream merging firm’s share of the downstream rival’s input
purchases and the fact that the upstream merging firm’s dollar margin is typically only a fraction
of the downstream rival’s dollar margin.
3.

Contribution to the dHHI in the Downstream Market

This analysis thus shows how the impact of the vertical merger on the incentives of the
downstream merging firm to raise price and reduce output, as measured by the vGUPPId, can be
reckoned into a dHHI calculation. The contribution of the vGUPPId to the dHHI can be
measured by the increase in the mHHI of the equivalent hypothetical partial ownership
transactions. This measure can be used even if there are no input foreclosure concerns.
The following examples show how this is calculated.
Example: Consider again the previous example with five symmetric
downstream firms that each have 20% market share. Suppose that the
upstream merging firm supplies 100% of the input needs of a single
downstream rival and that this one downstream rival is the only customer of
the merged firm. Suppose that the dollar margin ratio (of the upstream
merging firm to that rival) is 0.3. In this example, the increase in effective
concentration in the downstream market, as measured by the mHHI, is equal
to 120 (i.e., 0.3 x 20 x 20).
Example: Suppose instead that the upstream merging firm supplies 100% of
the input needs of two downstream rivals and these downstream rivals are the
only two customers of the merged firm, and the dollar margin ratio is 0.3.
The increase in effective concentration now is equal to 240 (i.e., 2 x 0.3 x 20
x 20).37
The increases in the mHHI for these examples reflect only the UPP on the downstream merging
firm’s output price. The dHHI measure must account for that UPP as well as the UPP on the
foreclosed rivals’ prices, as discussed next. Before doing so, it is useful to repeat that the
incentive of the downstream merging firm to raise price in order to drive additional sales to the
upstream merging firm occurs even if there is no foreclosure concern. This can lead to a large
dHHI even if there are no foreclosure concerns, which could be relevant to enforcement if
merger-specific EDM is small or non-existent.38
37

If instead there are two downstream customers but each one purchases only 50% of its input purchases
from the upstream merging firm, then the increase in effective concentration is equal to 120 (that is, 2 ×
0.5 × 0.3 × 20 × 20).
38

If there are no foreclosure concerns and the downstream firms are not symmetric, then the UPP may
outweigh the EDM of the downstream merging firm when the pre-merger world satisfies some or all of
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C.

Calculating the dHHI

The previous sections described two types of hypothetical horizontal transactions that together
can be used to proxy for a vertical merger that raises input foreclosure or downstream output
reduction concerns, and hence evaluate the merger’s impact on effective concentration in the
downstream market. These two hypothetical transactions involve several partial ownership
interests among the downstream firms, which then can be combined in order to evaluate their
total impact on the effective level of concentration in the downstream market. The dHHI
measures that total impact.
The dHHI specifically is equal to the sum of the individual dHHIs from each of these proxy
transactions, that is, (i) each of the foreclosed rivals acquiring a silent financial interest
BRD = PTRU in the downstream merging firm, and (ii) the downstream merging firm acquiring a
silent financial interest BDR = SUR × MUR × WUR / (MR × PR) in each rival that purchases the input
of the upstream merging firm. Applying this formula to the two types of hypothetical
transactions, we obtain the total increase in the dHHI,

𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 𝑃𝑇𝑅

× 𝑆 × 𝑆 +

R

SUR ×

MUR × WUR
× SR × SD
MR × PR

(6)

where SD denotes the market share of the downstream merging firm, SF denotes the total market
share of foreclosed rivals in the downstream market, and SR is the market share of an individual
rival of the downstream merging firm. Note that the last term in equation (6) is a summation
over all the rivals of the downstream merging firm.
Consider again the case where all the rivals of the downstream merging firm are similarly
situated in that they all procure the same share 𝑆 of their input needs from the upstream
merging firm, and they all have the same margin ratio MUR × WUR / (MR × PR). If they all are
potential targets for input foreclosure, then the above dHHI becomes

𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ( 𝑃𝑇𝑅 + 𝑆

×

MUR × WUR
) × S ×(1 − 𝑆 )
MR × PR

(7)

the following properties: (a) the downstream merging firm buys fewer inputs from the upstream merging
firm than its rivals do; (b) the upstream merging firm earns a lower dollar margin on input sales to the
downstream merging firm than it earns on input sales to rival downstream firms; (c) downstream market
demand is sufficiently inelastic; and (d) the downstream merging firm has little ability to substitute inputs
from rival suppliers with inputs from the upstream merging firm. However, if there are no foreclosure
concerns, then the EDM outweighs the UPP of the downstream merging firm when the downstream firms
are symmetric, as shown in Moresi & Salop, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., and Chen,
supra note 17.
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This expression can be used to measure the increase in effective concentration in the downstream
market that results from a vertical merger that raises input foreclosure or output reduction
concerns.
The dHHI calculation can be illustrated by combining the two parts of the previous numerical
examples, where we assume PTRu = 50%, MUR × WUR / (MR × PR) = 0.3, and SD = 20%.
Example: Suppose only one downstream rival is customer of the upstream
merging firm and purchases the input exclusively from the upstream merging
firm (that is, 𝑆 = 100%), and this customer is targeted for input
foreclosure. Thus, dHHI = (0.5 + 0.3) × 20 × 20 = 320. This is the sum of
the dHHI contribution of 200 from the transaction equivalent to the vGUPPIr
and a contribution of 120 from the transaction equivalent to the vGUPPId.
Example: Suppose instead that two downstream rivals are fully supplied by
the upstream merging firm and are potentially targeted for input foreclosure.
In this case, the dHHI is 640, which is comprised of a contribution of 400
from the transaction equivalent to the vGUPPIr and 240 from the transaction
equivalent to the vGUPPId.
These examples indicate the need to identify the set of downstream rivals that might be targeted
for input foreclosure by the merged firm. All the rivals must be identified in order to obtain an
accurate dHHI measure. If there is no input foreclosure but only downstream output concerns,
then the dHHI would include only the second term in equation (6) above.
IV.

Applying the dHHI in Vertical Merger Analysis

The dHHI and the associated post-merger HHI levels have several possible roles in vertical
merger analysis. They can be used as a rough gauge of competitive concerns in vertical mergers
involving potential input foreclosure or output price increases. They also in principle might be
useful in forming a safe harbor screen or a concentration-based anticompetitive presumption for
vertical mergers that raise input foreclosure or output reduction concerns, possibly along with
other evidence.
A.

The Role of the dHHI

The dHHI can be used as an initial, rough screen for the competitive concerns from a vertical
merger that involves potential input foreclosure or output price increases. The dHHI only
measures first-round effects on pricing incentives, just as do the standard GUPPIs used in
horizontal merger analysis. Focusing on these first-round effects, a higher dHHI suggests greater
anticompetitive concerns.
These first-round effects on pricing incentives specifically exclude the following feedback
effects.
18

First, the first-round effects do not take into account the impact of the pricing incentives of the
targeted rivals (following input foreclosure) on the pricing incentives of the downstream merging
firm. Nor do they take into account the impact of the pricing incentives of the downstream
merging firm on the pricing incentives of the targeted rivals. These feedback effects could
exacerbate the competitive harms, just as is the case for horizontal mergers. In Section V, we
show how simultaneous effects on pricing incentives can be calculated, just as they can for
horizontal GUPPIs.39
Second, the first-round effects assume that non-targeted downstream firms do not change their
prices in response to the foreclosure of the targeted downstream rivals. Since the foreclosed
rivals will have the incentive to raise their prices, these non-targeted competitors would tend to
have the incentive to respond by raising their prices. This also creates feedback effects among
the price increases that could exacerbate the competitive harms further, just as it occurs for
horizontal mergers.
Third, the first-round effects do not take into account possible entry or repositioning by
competing upstream firms or non-targeted downstream firms. Nor do they take into account
possible repositioning by the upstream and downstream divisions of the merged firm. These
effects could mitigate or offset the competitive harms, just as is the case for horizontal mergers.
Fourth, the first-round effects taken into account in the dHHI do not include any downward
pricing pressure from cognizable efficiency benefits, including EDM. These effects would
mitigate or offset the competitive harms, if they are cognizable, just as it occurs for horizontal
mergers. These effects would be included in a full competitive effects analysis, but not in a
proxy concentration measure used for a safe harbor screen or an anticompetitive presumption.
This is the approach in the HMGs, even though it commonly is said that many horizontal
mergers also generate efficiency benefits.
Fifth, the first-round effects in equation (1) do not account for the possibility of any input
substitution by the targeted downstream rivals, whereby the targeted rivals would reduce input
purchases from the merged firm and increase input purchases from upstream rivals of the merged
firm. Nor do they account for accommodating responses by those upstream competitors,
whereby the upstream competitors also would increase the input prices charged to the targeted
downstream firms. However, as we discuss below, equation (1) would remain a good
approximation if input substitution were possible and the competitors of the upstream merging
firm would respond to the increase in demand for their inputs by matching the upstream merging
firm’s price increases. The input substitution tends to reduce the upstream merging firm’s
39

The simultaneous GUPPIs for horizontal mergers are equal to the compensating marginal cost
reductions (“CMCRs”) expressed as a percentage of price. Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Test for
Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of Differentiated Products, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 409
(1996). The corresponding price increases also can be calculated if one assumes linear demand. Jerry
Hausman, Serge Moresi & Mark Rainey, Unilateral Effects of Mergers with General Linear Demand, 111
ECON. LETTERS 119 (2011).
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incentive to raise its input prices to targeted downstream rivals, which tends to reduce the
increase in the marginal cost of the targeted rivals, and hence reduces the targeted rivals’
incentives to raise their output price. At the same time, the accommodating input price increases
by upstream competitors tend to increase the targeted rivals’ marginal costs, which in turn tends
to increase their incentives to raise output prices to consumers. The combined assumptions of no
input substitution and no accommodating price responses by upstream rivals is the simplest case
to analyze for the dHHI.
B.

Input Substitution

Our derivation of the dHHI assumes that the downstream rivals targeted for input price increases
by the upstream merging firm are unable to substitute the input of the upstream merging firm
with inputs supplied by other upstream firms. We have made this assumption for several
reasons.
First, it substantially simplifies the data requirements and calculations. For the dHHI, the analyst
needs the following data: the upstream cost pass-through rate (PTRU), the market share of the
downstream merging firm (SD), the total market share of the foreclosed downstream rivals (SF)
and, for each downstream rival, the rival’s market share (SR), the upstream merging firm’s share
of the rival’s input purchases (SUR), the input price paid to the upstream merging firm by the rival
(WUR), the percentage margin earned by the upstream merging firm on input sales to the rival
(MUR), and the percentage margin (MR) and output price (PR) of the rival. These data often are
readily available.
Our vGUPPI article explains how the vGUPPIs are altered when there is input substitution and
describes the additional data requirements.40 The dHHI also would require data on the
downstream pass-through elasticity (EP), which might not be so difficult to estimate.41 However,
the dHHI calculation also would require an estimate of the “elasticity of substitution” (ESR),
which can be difficult to estimate precisely. 42 The estimation of this elasticity might require a
full study of the input market.43

40

Moresi & Salop, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 202–204.

41

EP denotes the elasticity of the price of the targeted rival (PR) with respect to an increase in the input
price that the rival must pay to the upstream merging firm (WUR).
42

ESR denotes the elasticity of the upstream merging firm’s share of the rival’s input purchases (SUR) with
respect to an increase in the input price that the rival must pay to the upstream merging firm (WUR).
43

Our vGUPPI article provides a method for “calibrating” the values of EP and ESR, but this requires
assuming pre-merger symmetric downstream firms and obtaining estimates for the downstream cost passthrough rate (PTRR) and the aggregate price elasticity of downstream market demand (E). Moresi &
Salop, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 205. In addition, the calibration of EP can be more
complicated when there are multiple targeted rivals. Id. at n.49.
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In fact, the study of upstream competition would need to go even further. When there is no input
substitution, the focus on first-round effects and the assumption that upstream competitors’
prices are constant do not create any distortion. When there is input substitution, the vGUPPIr,
mGUPPIr and dHHI would be lower, if it is assumed that the upstream competitors’ prices do
not change. However, a more reliable analysis should recognize that input substitution increases
the demand faced by upstream rivals, and thus upstream rivals may have an incentive to raise
their prices in response to the price increase by the upstream merging firm. Taking these likely
reactions into account would require a more complex analysis of upstream competition. The role
of the dHHI calculation is to provide a rough indicator, not to capture all the complexities of
competition. If the agencies decide to investigate the merger further, those complexities could be
analyzed using simulation models, econometrics, analysis of business strategy documents, and so
on. The accommodating response by upstream competitors may be predicted to be larger if the
upstream market is more concentrated, if the inputs are less differentiated or if the suppliers have
rising marginal costs.
Second, if the dHHI were used as part of a safe harbor for vertical mergers involving input
foreclosure concerns, a conservative approach to the dHHI should be taken. If the upstream
competitors were to match the input price increases of the upstream merging firm, that likely
would completely offset the effects of input substitution, and hence input substitution would not
occur. If instead the upstream rivals would not fully match, then there would be some input
substitution and that would tend to reduce the dHHI depending on the elasticity of substitution
and the extent of partial price matching. The dHHI that we have proposed (assuming no input
substitution and no responses by upstream rivals) likely is a good approximation for the case
with both input substitution and responses from upstream rivals. While one cannot claim that
there would be full price matching by upstream rivals and hence no input substitution, that
assumption is the conservative one.44 The assumption of full matching also might suggest a
conservative approach to any anticompetitive presumption based solely on the dHHI (and
associated post-merger HHI).
V.

The vGUPPI Methodology, Feedback Effects, and Simultaneous vGUPPIs

Preliminary analysis of vertical mergers involving input foreclosure or output reduction concerns
might focus directly on the vGUPPIs themselves rather than using the partial ownership dHHI
proxy that is based on the vGUPPIs. If there is no input substitution, these vGUPPIs are
relatively simple to calculate, as shown above in equations (1) and (3).
As already discussed, the vGUPPIs measure only first-round effects. They do not take into
account the pricing responses of upstream rivals and non-foreclosed downstream rivals of the
merged firm. The individual vGUPPIs also hold the merging firms’ other prices at the premerger level. In particular, vGUPPIr measures the UPP for the price of the output sold by a
44

In addition, all the potentially foreclosed firms should be included in the analysis.
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foreclosed rival, while holding constant the price of the output sold by the downstream merging
firm. Similarly, vGUPPId measures the UPP for the price of the output sold by the downstream
merging firm, holding constant the price of the input that the upstream merging firm charges to
rival downstream firms. This is the same approach used in calculating the GUPPIs for horizontal
mergers that are discussed in the HMGs. As a first-round analysis, the vGUPPId utilized for the
dHHI also does not take cognizable EDM or other efficiencies into account. This is also the
approach used in calculating the horizontal merger GUPPIs.
Two recent papers have suggested that these assumptions render the vGUPPI methodology as
inherently flawed. In particular, the vGUPPIu always predicts that the merged firm will have an
incentive to raise rivals’ costs, but a simulation model that takes into account the existence of
significant merger-specific EDM may predict that the merged firm actually will decrease the
input price that it charges to downstream rivals. 45 These papers also have suggested that
vGUPPIr is similarly a poor proxy for the downstream effects in the presence of merger-specific
EDM, because vGUPPIr always predicts that the foreclosed rivals will have an incentive to raise
price, whereas there can be situations where a simulation model predicts that rivals’ costs will be
raised and yet all consumer prices will fall.
A.

Explaining the Feedback Effects

In our view, these criticisms miss the mark. The criticisms mistake an initial screen for a full
merger analysis. For example, while these papers focus on vertical mergers, similar criticisms
can be made about the use of standard GUPPIs in horizontal mergers when there are cognizable
efficiency benefits.46 The criticisms further assume that EDM will always occur, will be
relatively large, and will be merger-specific. However, EDM may not satisfy these conditions
for many mergers.

45

Gopal Das Varma & Martino De Stefano, Equilibrium Analysis of Vertical Mergers, 65 ANTITRUST
BULLETIN 455 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X20929138 (“Under certain commonly used
assumptions, a vertical merger may even create an incentive for the merged firm to lower its rivals’
cost.”); Gleb Domnenko & David S. Sibley, Simulating Vertical Mergers and the Vertical GUPPI
Approach (Jan. 1, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3447687 (“In the
simulations, the upstream price paid by the remaining downstream rival can either rise or fall.”).
46

The GUPPIs for horizontal mergers are always positive in the absence of efficiencies. Consider a
horizontal merger of Firm-A and Firm-B, and suppose the merger will generate cost savings for Firm-A
only. Suppose the net UPP for the product of Firm-A is negative, so that on balance there is downward
pricing pressure on the price charged by Firm-A. That does not affect the GUPPI of Firm-B which
remains positive. However, a merger simulation model might predict that the prices of both Firm-A and
Firm-B will fall. For example, this can occur if demand is linear, the diversion ratio from Firm-A to
Firm-B is relatively high, and the diversion ratio from Firm-B to Firm-A is relatively low.
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The criticisms also are misplaced because our 2013 article did not ignore EDM but rather
cautioned about potential price feedback effects within the merging firms. 47 In fact, that article
reported several vGUPPId measures: vGUPPId1 does not take EDM into account because EDM
may not occur or may not be merger-specific; vGUPPId2 takes merger-specific EDM into
account and may be negative; and vGUPPId3 takes EDM into account and assumes further
efficiencies from input substitution.48
The vGUPPId1 measure is always positive, reflecting the fact that the downstream division of
the merged firm has an incentive to raise price to consumers because it takes into account that
raising its price and losing sales to rival downstream firms will lead those rivals to purchase
additional inputs from the upstream division. Where there is no cognizable EDM, vGUPPId1
and vGUPPIr (or vGUPPIu) will understate the ultimate incentives to raise price because they
ignore feedback effects that would reinforce one another.49
When there is merger-specific EDM, the situation is different. Merger-specific EDM can
mitigate the UPP from vGUPPId1 or even reverse the effect and create DPP. That is, vGUPPId2
can be negative if merger-specific EDM is relatively large. In this situation, the vGUPPIr (or
vGUPPIu) will overstate the ultimate incentive to raise price because it ignores feedback effects.
To account for these feedback effects, we suggested that a full-blown vertical merger simulation
model might be estimated and run. 50 The two papers discussed here took this suggested
simulation approach and compared their results with the simple vGUPPIs for the case where
there is an upstream monopolist that is the only potential supplier to all the downstream firms.
With a monopolist input supplier and linear input prices, the pre-merger upstream margin of the
monopolist is relatively high and, therefore, a vertical merger is bound to generate relatively
large EDM.
In these conditions, the vGUPPIu and vGUPPIr measures may not perform well in comparison
to simulation models in the sense that they may have the wrong sign. This will depend on the
structure of the demand and competition. In the case with linear demand and two perfectly
symmetric downstream firms, for example, equilibrium upstream and downstream prices fall
after a vertical merger between the upstream monopolist and one of the two downstream firms. 51
If the competitors in the downstream market are not symmetric, prices may either rise or fall,
47
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They also would be reinforced by the accommodating price responses of non-merging firms.
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See Shihua Lu, Serge Moresi & Steven C. Salop, A Note on Vertical Mergers with an Upstream
Monopolist: Foreclosure and Consumer Welfare Effects, (June 2007), at 15,
https://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/Merging-with-an-upstream-monopolist.pdf. This
earlier unpublished article used a linear demand model and was a building block for the two papers.
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depending on the type of asymmetry and the downstream market elasticity. If downstream firms
can engage in coordinated conduct, rather than the unilateral conduct assumed in the vGUPPIs
and standard simulation models, prices may not fall because the merger may facilitate
downstream coordination.52
The simulation results presented in those two papers are straightforward to explain. First, those
studies consider situations where EDM is relatively large. When merger-specific EDM is
relatively small, vGUPPIu and vGUPPIr perform well. In fact, as noted above, vGUPPId2 is
positive when EDM is relatively small, and a positive vGUPPId2 reinforces the UPP from the
vGUPPIr or vGUPPIu.
Second, the vGUPPIs gauge only first-round effects and do not take into account pricing
feedback effects between the two merging firms. The feedback effects can be important and
should be taken into account when merger-specific EDM is relatively large. It also is clear that
the net effect can be to reduce all prices paid by downstream rivals and consumers, if mergerspecific EDM is large enough.
Third, our 2013 article stated that 53 “If vGUPPId < 0, it will mitigate and possibly reverse the
impact of vGUPPIr > 0, which would lead to a lower likelihood of significant adverse effects.
The first-round net incentive effect on downstream prices then might be gauged roughly by
calculating a weighted average of vGUPPIr and vGUPPId.” In fact, it is straightforward to
account for feedback effects between the pricing incentives of the two merging firms. This
involves simultaneously adjusting the vGUPPIu of the upstream merging firm and the
vGUPPId2 of the downstream merging firm to account for the feedback effects. We call these
adjusted vGUPPIs the “simultaneous vGUPPIu” and “simultaneous vGUPPId2,” and denote
them by “SvGUPPIu” and “SvGUPPId2” respectively. They are derived in the same way as the
simultaneous GUPPIs for horizontal mergers. 54 The simultaneous vGUPPIs can be used to
account for the feedback effect of merger-specific EDM (vGUPPId2) on input foreclosure
incentives (vGUPPIu).
B.

Simultaneous vGUPPIs

We turn next to the derivation of these simultaneous vGUPPIs. Consider the model used in the
two papers: a monopolist upstream supplier (U) sells inputs to two downstream manufacturers
(D and R) and wants to merge with D. The SvGUPPIu and SvGUPPId2 are expressed as a
percentage of price and are given by the following system of two equations:
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where MUD and WUD denote the percentage margin and input price of the upstream merging firm
U for input sales to the downstream merging firm D in the pre-merger market. Note that, if we
set SvGUPPId2 = 0 in equation (8), then equation (8) reduces to the simple vGUPPIu of our
article. Similarly, if we set SvGUPPIu = 0 in equation (9), then equation (9) reduces to the
simple vGUPPId2 of our article. The presence of the two vGUPPIs in both equations (8) and (9)
captures the feedback effects.
Solving equations (8) and (9) simultaneously for SvGUPPIu and SvGUPPId2 yields the
following simultaneous vGUPPIs, which have the form of a weighted sum of the simple
vGUPPIu and vGUPPId2:

𝑆𝑣𝐺𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑢 = 𝑍 × ( 𝑣𝐺𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑢 + 𝐷𝑅
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× 𝑣𝐺𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑢 ×

𝑊
𝑃

)

(11)

where Z = 1 / (1 - DRRD × DRDR) is a scale factor that exceeds unity. Equations (10) and (11)
show how to obtain the simultaneous vGUPPIs that account for feedback effects between the
merging firm’s incentives using the simple vGUPPIs provided in our vGUPPI article (which do
not account for feedback effects).
To see the impact of the feedback effects, note that in equation (10) the simultaneity leads to
SvGUPPIu > vGUPPIu when vGUPPId2 ≥ 0. This is because vGUPPId2 is first-round and
thus implicitly assumes vGUPPIu = 0. But since vGUPPIu > 0, we see from equation (11) that
SvGUPPId2 > 0 (when vGUPPId2 ≥ 0) and hence it follows from equation (8) that SvGUPPIu
> vGUPPIu (when vGUPPId2 ≥ 0). Intuitively, even if there were no first-round effect on the
pricing incentives of the downstream merging firm, there will be a second-round effect because
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of the first-round effect on the pricing incentives of the upstream merging firm, which will then
lead to a second-round effect on the pricing incentives of the upstream merging firm, and so on. 55
The two papers focus on the situations in which the simple vGUPPId2 is negative and relatively
large, so that it is possible that the simultaneous vGUPPIu in equation (10) turns negative.56 If
EDM is large and merger-specific, then a full competitive effects analysis must account for the
interaction of the upward and downward pricing pressure. The above simultaneous vGUPPIs
attempt to account for that interaction. This is why the simple first-round vGUPPIs are not
intended to serve as a complete competitive effects analysis. 57
While vGUPPIu can turn negative when EDM is merger-specific and relatively large, we caution
that the presence of large merger-specific EDM is not inevitable and cannot be assumed on
faith.58 Indeed, a recent article reported empirical evidence from a large database of vertically
integrated firms that indicated that there were no internal input transfers from the upstream
division to the downstream division in about half of all the vertically-integrated firms studied. 59
And there are numerous reasons why EDM would not occur even when there are internal
transfers of inputs.60
Finally, the two papers assume that the upstream merging firm is a monopolist. In a nonmonopoly scenario, the upstream merging firm would face competition and that affects the
analysis. Upstream competition reduces the pre-merger equilibrium upstream margin below the
monopoly level, and a lower upstream margin implies that a vertical merger leads to smaller
EDM.61 In addition, in a non-monopoly scenario with input substitution, the upstream
55

Similarly, when vGUPPIu ≥ 0 in equation (11), the simultaneity leads to |SvGUPPId2| > |vGUPPId2|.
This is because vGUPPIu is first-round and thus implicitly assumes vGUPPId2 = 0. But if vGUPPId2 <
0, we see from equation (10) that SvGUPPIu < 0 (when vGUPPIu ≥ 0) and hence it follows from
equation (9) that |SvGUPPId2| > |vGUPPId2| (when vGUPPIu ≥ 0).
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competitors have the incentive to accommodate post-merger changes in the input price charged
by the merged firm. Thus, the overall results in a full-blown vertical merger simulation model
that takes into account upstream competition could differ substantially from their estimates in the
monopoly model. A model of a monopoly supplier is not the best model to guide vertical merger
policy. Few mergers involve monopolists and the monopoly model can be a poor predictor of
merger effects in oligopoly markets. Thus, it is false to claim that these papers show that
vGUPPI analysis is inherently flawed, that RRC and EDM are necessarily highly correlated or
that the Agencies should have the burden of proof to show that merger-specific EDM will not
occur, rather than the conventional antitrust approach of allocating the burden to show mergerspecific efficiencies on the merging parties. 62
VI.

Conclusions

The dHHI shows that vertical mergers involving input foreclosure or output reduction concerns
have an analogue to horizontal consolidation in the downstream market. This is a significant
result because it shows that there is not the type of inherent difference in the effects of vertical
and horizonal mergers that is sometimes claimed. At the same time, we do not want to
overclaim that the use the dHHI and the resulting post-merger HHI is an airtight gauge of the
likely impact of vertical mergers that raise input foreclosure or output reduction concerns. As we
have stressed in this paper, the dHHI gauges only first-round effects and only for unilateral input
foreclosure and unilateral output price increases. The same point applies to analysis directly
based on the levels of the vGUPPIs. However, we are confident that using the HHI either alone
or in conjunction with our dHHI approach would provide a useful gauge. Therefore, we believe
that the dHHI approach should be investigated further.
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